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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The City believes that Majestic's Brief requires a response
in several areas.
compensation

First, Majestic suggests that their award of

for an interest

in the land was

substantial competent evidence-

supported

by

Acceptance of this argument

would result in Majestic being compensated twice for the value
of the buildings and improvements.

Close examination of the

evidence put forth in both Appellant's and Respondents' Brief
reveals that only the evidence cited by the City refers to land
value.

The evidence which Majestic would have the court rely on

clearly applies to not only land value, but also the value of
the buildings
already

and

received

improvements

on the

compensation

for

land.
these

Majestic
buildings

had
and

improvements and to include them again in an analysis of land
value is clearly erroneous.
The second issue involves the standard of review in this
case.

Although

it is correct that for certain

issues the

"clearly erroneous" standard of review should be used, it is
also important for the court to note that other issues should be
reviewed upon a "correctness" standard.

More specifically, the

trial court's failure to value the property as if unencumbered,
and the trial court's interpretation of the condemnation clause
contained in the lease, are both Conclusions of Law.

This court

should review those Conclusions under a "correctness" standard
and

give

decision.

no

preferential

treatment

to

the

trial

Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates
1

court's
that

the

incorrect Conclusions of Law by the trial court resulted in
Majestic being awarded excess value.
It is also important that this Court note that West Valley
City has not waived any rights with regard to this appeal.
Majestic

has

suggested

that

a

letter

offering

Partial

Satisfaction of Judgment, which was specifically rejected by
Majestic, has somehow bound the City into waiving its rights to
appeal

portions

misstated

the

of
facts

the

Judgment.

regarding

the

Majestic
Partial

has

completely

Satisfaction

of

Judgment, which is clearly demonstrated by correspondence from
Majestic and the language of the Partial Satisfaction itself.
Finally, Majestic's contention that the City's Brief does
not comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is without
merit.

The City's Brief is concise and complete, and provides

the court with an understanding of the errors that were made,
where in the record those errors were found, and why relief is
necessary.

Attempts, such as this, to put form over substance

should not be considered by this court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT HAS MET ITS BURDEN OF MARSHALLING ALL
EVIDENCE REGARDING MAJESTICirS SHARE OF THE VALUE OF
THE LAND.

THAT EVIDENCE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT

MAJESTIC HAD NO BONUS VALUE IN THE LAND.
Majestic asserts that the finding of a compensable interest
in the value of the land was supported by substantial competent

evidence at trial.

Without close examination of the testimony,

this may appear to be true; however, Majestic has missed the
point of this argument and their reliance on their appraiser,
Mr. Webber's testimony, is misplaced.
Majestic cites several pages in the transcript wherein Mr.
Webber testified as to Majestic's compensable interest in the
"land". Upon closer examination, his testimony concerns a bonus
value based upon Majestic's "land, buildings and improvements".
Majestic has even conceded as much in their Brief.

(Majestic

Brief, p. 27)
The extensive quotations from the record contained in West
Valley City's Brief present evidence on the issue of land value
only.

The value of

the buildings and

considered at that point.
in

this

case.

improvements

is not

That is clearly the correct analysis

Majestic's

interest

in

the

buildings

and

improvements upon the land is specifically allocated under the
terms of the lease.

That allocation was taken into account by

the trial court which awarded Majestic the sum of $223,665.00 as
their compensable interest in the buildings and improvements.
Majestic is now suggesting that the inclusion of the value of
buildings and improvements in a determination of land value was
proper.

The portions of the transcript cited by Majestic are

inapplicable to a discussion of the issue of land value only.
With one exception, West Valley City's Brief sets forth all
of the evidence put forth at trial regarding the value of the

3

land only.

That exception was a portion of redirect examination

of Mr, Webber in which he stated that:
"Under that scenario the contract rent as called for
between the Pickrell, as lessor, and Majestic, as
lessee, is equal to the contract length as called for
in the Majestic to the Prudential leases, therefore,
there is no measurable interest," (R. 375, p, 79)
Mr, Webber went on to say that his determination of total value
changed because of the buildings and improvements constructed by
Majestic.

Based upon this analysis of the evidence, it is clear

that there exists no evidence whatsoever that Majestic had a
compensable

interest

in

the

land.

Majestic's

compensable

interest in this case is derived solely from the buildings and
improvements which they constructed upon the property and the
trial court awarded them compensation for those buildings and
improvements based upon the lease provisions. While West Valley
City certainly agrees that Majestic is entitled to compensation
for the buildings and improvements, it is equally important that
there

should

be no recovery where there has been no

loss.

(Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc., v. State of New
York, 22 N.Y.2d

75, 238 N.E.2d

705, 291 N.Y.S.2d

299, 210

(1968)) Majestic has utterly failed to demonstrate any evidence
that they have a compensable interest in the land.

All their

evidence pertains to compensable interest in the buildings and
improvements,

and

Majestic

is

not

entitled

to

receive

compensation twice for the same buildings and improvements;
therefore, the trial court's awarding compensation to Majestic
for land value was clearly erroneous.
4

ARGUMENT
POINT II
THE STANDARD IN THIS CASE MUST VARY WITH THE ISSUES,
CERTAIN ISSUES SHOULD BE REVIEWED ON A CORRECTNESS
STANDARD.
Majestic
"clearly

is correct in its analysis of the use of the

erroneous"

standard

with

interpreted by use of parol evidence.

regard

to

contracts

However, other issues in

this appeal should be reviewed under the "correctness" standard.
A.

The Trial Court's Failure to Value the Property As a

Whole Unit, As If Unencumbered, Prior to Apportionincr the Value
Between the Fee Holder and Lease Holders, Should Be Reviewed
Under the Correctness Standard.
The trial judge's decision not to value the property
as if unencumbered

is clearly a legal conclusion and not a

finding of fact, and therefore does not fall within the "clearly
erroneous" standard set forth in Rule 52A, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Judge Russon, in his Conclusions of Law, stated that

the value of the property should be determined as a whole and
then the same apportioned among the several owners according to
their respective interests or estates.

(R. 356-357) While this

is not a misstatement of the law, it is an incomplete statement
of the law.

It is not just the value of the whole that should

be determined, but it is the value of the unencumbered whole.
The law in the State of Utah is clear that the leased
property should be valued as though it were held in a single
5

ownership, rather than by separately evaluating the interests of
the lessor and the lessee.

This concept is set forth at 29A

C.J.S. "Eminent Domain", §198, and has been specifically adopted
by the Utah Supreme Court.
445 P.2d

703,

(Oqden City v. Stephens, (Utah 1975)

(1968) 21 Utah

2d

336; see also

State Road

Commission v. Brown, 531 P. 2d 1294 (Utah 1975))

A detailed

discussion of the law is found in Appellant's Brief at pages 23
and 24.

Utah -does not stand alone in taking this view.

cases cited

as authority

in Respondent's

Brief

Even

state that,

" . . .where there are two or more interests or estates

in a

condemned parcel, the proper mode of assessing damages is to
ascertain

first

the

damage

to

the

fee

as

if

it

were

unencumbered, and then to apportion that amount among all of the
estates and interests which are held in the property, (citations
omitted)"

(emphasis added)

Company, Inc.,

(Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea

supra)

The trial judge not only omitted the "unencumbered" factor
from the determination, but specifically held that the MajesticPrudential and Majestic-Lockhart

leases

"should and must be

taken into consideration in determining the fair market value of
the property and the property interests in question."
354)

(R. 313,

(Also see Page 5 of Ruling, attached as Addendum 1.)
This clear error by the trial judge renders the Brown

concept that the parts shall never exceed the unencumbered whole
meaningless.
Prudential

Obviously if the parts, in this case the Majestic-

and

Majestic-Lockhart

6

leases, are

included

when

determining the value of the whole, then the whole will become
the sum of the parts.

In this scenario, where the value of the

parts are used to help determine the value of the whole, there
will

never be a situation in which the parts exceed the whole

and the rules as set forth in the Ogden City and State Road
Commission v. Brown cases will be rendered useless.
It

is

also

clear

from

the

evidence

that

Majestic's

appraiser, Mr. Webber, took the leases into account during his
appraisal process.

In his direct examination, while describing

his various appraisal methods, he responded as follows:
Q
And did you take into account the leases that
were on the property, on the subject property?
A

Yes, I did,

Q
What leases?
Would you identify them just by
general description, please, that you took into account?
A
There were actually three leases on the property.
There was a land lease with a Pickrell or Granger Shopping
Center as the lessor, and Majestic Investment Company as
the lessee. That lease secured Majestic's position in the
property, there were also individual leases from Majestic
as the lessor to the Lockhart Company as lessee, and
Majestic as lessor to Prudential as lessee.
Q

And what importance did those leases have to you?

A
Those leases because they were, No. 1, they were
encumbering the fee estate. The land lease was encumbering
the fee estate. Also Majestic in a leasehold position was
secured by those leases. They had great importance to the
valuation of this particular property.
Q

In what regard?

A
In the value of income producing property, the
basic premise is that an income producing property sales in
relationship to its capacity or its capability to produce
income.
The higher the income stream a property can
produce, the higher its value. If the property has a low
income stream, it would have a lower value. So, the income
7

stream is a very important consideration in the appraisal
of real estate,
Q
Were the particular parties as to whom the leases
involved, I think you mentioned them.
Were they of
interest to you in your assignment of determining fair
market value of both the total properties and Majestic's
interest?
A
Yes, they were,
(R, 374, pp, 85-86)
Also, Mr, Webber, upon questioning by the court, testified that
the value may have been different if the leases had been for a
shorter term.

(R. 374, pp. 146-153)

If his determination of value of the property is dependent
upon the term of the leaseholds, then the leaseholds must have
been used in the calculation of value.

Obviously, if he uses

the leaseholds to determine value, then he is finding the value
of the encumbered whole, rather than the unencumbered whole.
Mr. Webber later testifies that what he has calculated is
the

"property

in

fee"

as

if

"the

underlying

land

and

improvements were owned by one person", and "This is for the
total property."

(R. 374 p. 154, lines 13-15, 19-20)

However,

his earlier testimony, quoted and cited above, certainly reveals
that he did not value the property as if unencumbered.

In fact,

immediately after testifying that this was fee value, "...the
total property", he agreed that
of

"total property" meant the

underlying

ownership

Pickrell,

together

Majestic.

(R. 374, p. 154, lines 21-25)

with

that

of

As this testimony

clearly demonstrates, Mr. Webber not only took the leases into
account, but contrary to law, he also considered the specific

8

identity of the lessee's as he determined the "fair market value
of both the total properties and Majestic's interest".

This

approach, which was allowed by the trial court's interpretation
of law, is in direct conflict with the law of

this State.

Should this ruling be allowed to stand, the Qgden City and Brown
cases will have been circumvented and the total value of the
property

inflated.

The

ruling by the

trial

court was

an

improper application of the law which lead to improper valuation
and should be reviewed by this court under the

correctness

standard.
B.

The

Condemnation

Trial

Court's

Clause

Should

Interpretation

Be Reviewed

Under

of
a

the

Lease

Correctness

Standard.
The trial court ruled that the condemnation clause in
the ground lease between Majestic and the landowner did not
operate to terminate the rights of Majestic upon condemnation by
West Valley City.

The court received no parol evidence on this

issue, and therefore it should be reviewed under a correctness
standard.
interpreted

The
as

interpretation

terms
a

and

matter

should

be

provisions
of

law

of

and

accorded

no

the
the

contract

were

trial

court's

particular

weight.

(Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985))
Majestic, in its Brief, focuses only on the first sentence
of

the

condemnation

clause, and

based

upon

that

suggests that Majestic's right to share in the
award did not terminate.

sentence

compensation

However, in interpreting the meaning
9

of the condemnation
clause,

giving

clause, the court must read

effect

to

all

of

its

terms.

the entire
(Pepsi

Cola

Metropolitan Bottling Company v. Romley, 587 P. 2d 994 (Ariz.
App. 1978))

Upon reading the express language of the entire

condemnation clause, which takes up almost a page of the lease,
it becomes clear that the purpose of this clause is to terminate
the rights of Majestic as to any interests in the land and to
preserve the rights of Majestic as to interests in the buildings
and improvements which they constructed on the property.

In

particular, the court should note the final sentence of the
condemnation clause which provides that:
"If land only is condemned, with no effect
upon the improvement or rentals, lessor and
any secured party holding a lessee mortgage
on the above-described premises that is
affected by such condemnation shall share
in such award as their interests may
appear."
This demonstrates that the clear intent of the parties was that
Majestic not participate in any award of compensation for land
value.

The middle portion of the condemnation clause contains

a formula by which Majestic shall share in the compensation
award that represents the value of the buildings.
When read as a whole, the only way to harmonize all of the
provisions of the condemnation clause is to determine that it
was the intent of the parties that Majestic share in only the
value of the buildings erected on the property and not the value
of the land that is being condemned.

This is further evidenced

by the fact that Majestic specifically designed the ground lease

10

portions of the Prudential and Lockhart leases so that they
provided

the exact

same rental to Majestic as Majestic was

paying to the landowner.

This pass-through arrangement of rent

on the land clearly shows that it was the intent of the parties
that Majestic have no interest in the land, but only in the
buildings and improvements.
With no other evidence offered defining the terms of the
condemnation provision, the plain terms of the lease provision
apportioning

the

interpretation

award

of

the

should

govern.

condemnation

The

clause

trial
and

court's

award

of

compensation for Majestic's "land value" was clearly in error
and should be reviewed by this court under the
standard.
buildings

Majestic's
and

correctness

claim is limited to its value in the

improvements

as

allocated

by

the

express

provisions of the lease.

ARGUMENT
POINT III
WEST VALLEY CITY HAS NOT WAIVED ANY RIGHTS WITH REGARD
TO THIS APPEAL,
West Valley City has not waived any rights with regard to
this appeal.
Majestic has asserted that West Valley City has waived its
rights to appeal certain portions of the trial court's judgment
because of a partial satisfaction of that judgment. As Majestic
is well aware, this is not the case.
11

To substantiate its claim that West Valley City has waived
its rights, Majestic attached a letter from J. Richard Catten,
dated November
Judgment.

3, 1989, offering a Partial Satisfaction

(Respondent's Brief, Addendum 6)

of

This offer for

partial satisfaction was specifically rejected by the letter of
Majestic's counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr., of November 18,
1989, which is attached to this Brief as Addendum 2.

The basis

for rejection was that a partial satisfaction of judgment could
not be made for a specific portion of the judgment. Majestic is
now attempting to rely on a document that they specifically
rejected for the very reasons they now embrace, in order to
support their spurious argument that the City has waived its
rights.
Following
buildings

and

negotiation,

all

improvements

was

Satisfaction of Judgment.
that

document

states

language
deleted

with
from

regard
the

to

Partial

Furthermore, the final paragraph of

specifically

that,

"It

is

further

acknowledged that this Partial Satisfaction of Judgment shall
have no effect on the rights, standings or obligations of the
parties with respect to the appeal filed in this case with the
Utah Court of Appeals, as Case No- 890379-CA. "
Addendum 3.)

(Attached as

This version of the Satisfaction was accepted and

signed by counsel for Majestic.
This argument is not well founded, is wholly without merit,
and should be rejected by the court.
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ARGUMENT
POINT IV
WEST VALLEY CITY'S BRIEF COMPLIES WITH THE UTAH RULES
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Majestic's assertion that West Valley City's Brief does not
comply with the rules and

should therefore be dismissed is

wholly without merit.

It is an attempt

substance,

not

and

should

be

to put

considered

by

form over

this

court.

(Lawrence v. Valley National Bank, 478 P-2d 79 (Ariz. 1970))
Contrary

to

the

contentions

contained

in

Majestic's

argument, an analysis of the West Valley City Brief reveals
seventeen

separate

citations

or

references

to

the

including ten quotations, some more than a page long.

record,
The Brief

gives a fair representation of the facts relating to the issues
presented.
appellate

Certainly, the Brief meets the goal of enabling the
court

to

understand

what

particular

errors

were

allegedly made, where in the record those errors can be found,
and why

under

material

ones

the applicable
necessitating

authorities
reversal

those
or

errors

other

are

relief.

(Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P. 2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App.
1988)

Majestic takes particular issue with the Statement of

Facts in West Valley City's Brief.

The City's Statement of

Facts in the present case is concise as to the factual basis of
the case. This court has stated its displeasure with Statements
of Fact which are mere catalogues of pleadings and papers and
burdened with minutiae.

(Demetropoulos at 961)
13

Majestic's contention that the City has failed to marshall
all the facts supporting Majestic's position is also unfounded.
With regard to the bonus value that the trial court awarded to
Majestic for their interest in the land, West Valley City did,
in fact, marshall all the evidence on that issue in its Brief.
A discussion of that issue is contained elsewhere in this Reply
Brief.

The remaining

issues rciised by West Valley City

are

questions of law rather than fact, and West Valley City carries
no

burden

in

application

that

of

the

case.

The

marshalling

clearly erroneous

factual determinations

by the

trial

of

standard
court

and

inapplicable when reviewing questions of law.
Broadcasting

v.

Neale,

776

P.2d

643, 646

evidence
only
are

apply

and
to

therefore

(Mountain States
(Utah

App.

1989);

Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 8 4 , 88 (Utah App. 1 9 8 9 ) ; Bell
v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989))

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court
made significant errors in determining the compensable interest
in this case.
adequately

It is also clear that Majestic

explain

or

justify

those

errors.

is unable
There

was

to
no

evidence presented which supports an award to Majestic for the
value

of

the

land.

In

all

of

the

evidence

presented

by

Majestic, the bonus value that was awarded is clearly derived
from the value of the buildings and improvements rather than the
land.

Majestic

is

suggesting

14

that

it

is

proper

that

the

buildings and improvements be counted not only in determination
of the land value, but that they also receive compensation for
the buildings and improvements under the clear provisions of the
lease.

Majestic's own appraiser found that, as to land value

only, Majestic had no compensable interest.

The trial court's

determination that Majestic receive compensation for the value
of the land is clearly erroneous and this court should reverse
that finding.
It M s also clear that the trial court's failure to value
the

property

as

if

unencumbered

and

the

trial

court's

interpretation of the condemnation clause in the lease should be
reviewed on a "correctness" standard.

When reviewed under this

standard, the evidence and the case law plainly reveal that the
trail court's rulings were incorrect.

These incorrect rulings

lead to Majestic receiving compensation they were not entitled
to.

By incorrectly interpreting the condemnation clause, the

trial court awarded Majestic value in the land even though the
plain terms of the lease require otherwise.

This court should

reverse that ruling and restrict Majestic to the compensation
allowed

in the

lease, namely the apportioned

share of

the

buildings and improvements.
The trial court's

failure to value the property as if

unencumbered led to an incorrect total value.

If this court

should find that Majestic is entitled to a compensation award
for

interest

other

than

that

awarded

for

buildings

and

improvements, then the court should find that the value of the
15

encumbering leasehold interests were improperly used to find the
fee value of the "unencumbered whole1' and should, therefore,
remand the case with instructions to reduce the judgment by that
amount the leasehold value contributed to the value of the whole
parcel.
Finally, Majestic's contentions that West Valley City has
failed to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure and that
the City has waived its rights with regard to certain portions
of the appeal, are not based on fact, are without merit, and
should not be entertained by this court.
DATED this 13th day of August, 1990.

Attorney for
Vaklfey City
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Appellant,

West

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I, the undersigned, certify that on August / ^
1990, I
mailed, postage prepaid, four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to the following parties:
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Esq.
Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
Paul T. Moxley, Esq.
Matthew C. Barneck, Esq.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
Attorneys for Majestic Investment Co. , Respondent
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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ADDENDUM 1

RULING

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WEST VALLEY CITY, a municipal
corporation,

RULING
CIVIL NO. C-87-6899

Plaintiff,
vs.
MAJESTIC INVESTMENT COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, THE LOCKHART
CO.; PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Federal
corporation, and DOES 1
through 10,
Defendants.

This is a condemnation action wherein West Valley City seeks
to condemn the interests of Majestic Investment Company, lessee
of

the

property

in

question.

West Valley

settled with the owner of the property.

City

has

already

The lessee, Majestic,

was not a party to. nor participated in that settlement.
The

property

in

question

was

leased

by

the

owner

to

Majestic, and consisted of vacant and unimproved land and rights
of way.

The lease was executed in April of 1975 for a term of

35 years at $750.00 per month, with various CPI escalations.

The

lease permitted the lessee to construct office buildings with a
required minimum value, and the lease contained a condemnation
clause which read in part:

WEST VALLEY CITY V.
MAJESTIC INVESTMENT
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. . . The term herein demised and all rights
and obligations of the lessee hereunder shall
immediately cease and be adjusted as of the
time of such condemnation. Lessee shall have
claim and right to share in and receive that
amount of such award as represents that
portion of the buildings and improvements
erected on the demised premises by lessee of
which the number of months from the date of
such taking by condemnation to the date of
expiration of this lease bears to the total
number of months, whether the term herein
demised, to wit: 420 months.
Shortly after execution of the lease, Majestic constructed a
building and leased the same on a long-term 25 year lease to
Prudential at $375.00 per month for 3 00 months, plus a determined
amount in regards to the building and costs therein for a total
rental

amount

adjustments.

of
That

$1,112.00,
lease

subject

contained

to
a

certain

condemnation

periodic
clause

providing that the sublease terminated upon condemnation and
Prudential would not share in the proceeds, except for a pro-rata
share of any improvements Prudential might have made.
At

approximately

the

same time, Majestic

constructed a

building and leased the same on a long-term 25 year lease to
Lockhart for $375.00 per month for 300 months, plus a determined
amount in regards to the building and costs, for a total amount
of $961.10 per month for 300 months.

This lease also contained a

condemnation clause terminating Lockhartfs rights in the event of
condemnation, and prohibiting Lockhart from any share in the

WEST VALLEY CITY V.
MAJESTIC INVESTMENT
condemnation,

RULING

PAGE THREE

except

as

to

any

pro-rata

share

for

any

improvements made by Lockhart.
This matter is scheduled for trial on December 13, 1988.
Both parties have requested a preliminary ruling by the Court as
to

the

methodology

by

which

Majestic's

interest

is

to be

evaluated in this condemnation action.
The City's position is that in condemnation, property must
be

valued

as

a

whole

unit

as

if

unencumbered,

and

then

apportioned between the owner and the lessees, with the owner
receiving value of his reversionary interests and the lessee
receiving value for his leasehold interest.
changed by

However, such may be

agreement and the City claims that in this case

Majestic is limited in what it may recover by the lease with the
owner.

More specifically, the City claims that the condemnation

clause of the lease does not provide the lessee with a share in
the compensation award, or any interest that it may have, except
as to an interest in the buildings as set out in the lease.
Particularly, it is argued that the lessee is not entitled to a
share in regards to future lost rents.
The lessee, Majestic, takes the position that it has a
constitutional and compensable interest in property which cannot
be ignored by the condemning authority (West Valley City), and
for which Majestic must be paid just compensation.

It argues

that while in many cases the fair market value of only single
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ownership

is

equivalent

to

the

fair market value

interests

in the property, where premises are

of other

subject to a

strong, enduring leasehold with prime rated tenants, the fair
market value of the property must take into account and consider
the value which the prime leases add to the fee simple estate.
Majestic claims it is entitled to fair compensation for the value
of its leasehold, and that value should take into consideration
the subleases.

Majestic further claims that such rights are not

limited by the primary lease, that in order to be excluded from
its just share of the compensation, the lease must clearly and
unequivocally state such, and that the lease in question does not
by clear and specific language exclude the lessee from its share
in the compensation.
lease,

Majestic claims that its 35 year primary

its construction

of two bank buildings, its 25 year

subleases to Triple A tenants, and the fixed rentals over the 25
year

period

give

the

property

added

value

that

would

not

otherwise have been present but for the subleases, and that such
should be taken into consideration.

Otherwise, the City will

have reaped illegal and an unjust windfall.
The Court has given this matter careful consideration, and
rules as follows:
The owner is entitled to just compensation for the taking of
its reversionary interest in the property in question.
already settled with West Valley City.

It has
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The lessee is entitled to just compensation for the taking
of its leasehold rights to the property in question.

The value

of Majestic1s leasehold must take into consideration all leases
because of the particular facts in this case, to wit:

the length

of the primary lease, the provision for and contemplation that
Majestic

would

improve

the

property

with

minimum

value

requirements, the construction of buildings and improvements by
Majestic,

and

Majesticfs

long-term

25

year

leases

with

substantial lessees with rent certain.
There must be a determination of the fair market value of
the property as a whole, taking into consideration the value of
the

land,

the

buildings

and

improvements,

and

the

leases,

including the subleases.

From this determination there must be

an

the owner's

apportionment

as

to

interest

and Majestic's

interest.
Majestic
constructed

is also

and

entitled to a share of the buildings

improvements made by

it as provided

in the

condemnation clause of the lease.
The lease does not preclude Majestic from recovering its
fair share of the award for its leasehold interest.

There is no

language in the lease that precludes or limits Majestic from
sharing in a compensation award.

To preclude such recovery, the

preclusionary language must be clear and unequivocal.

This lease

merely states that in the event of condemnation, the rights and
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obligations of Majestic shall cease "and be adjusted as of the
term of such condemnation."

This is not sufficient to terminate

Majestic!s rights to its fair compensation.

The fact that the

lease further provides Majestic with a share in the buildings
which it constructed does not limit Majestic1s rights to also
share in the compensation award as to its other interests.
In this case West Valley City has already made a settlement
with the owner of the fee.
settlement.

Majestic was not a party to that

And, that settlement cannot

limit or otherwise

affect the amount to which Majestic is entitled.

There still

must be a determination of the fair market value of the property,
taking into consideration the land, buildings and improvements,
and leases as well as a determination of the portion of such
value to which Majestic is entitled.
Dated this

c3-0

day of November, 1988.

/ 4> / JL&rTia rcC

^

P\U S'*cry^

LEONARD H. RUSSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following, this
day of November, 1988:

Robert S. Campbell, Jr.
H. Dickson Burton
Attorneys for Majestic Investment Co.
310 S. Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Harold A. Hintze
3319 N. University Ave., Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84 604
Paul T. Morris
J. Richard Catten
2470 S. Redwood Road
West Valley City, Utah

84119

Joseph J. Palmer
Wayne G. Getty

15 East 100 South,

Suite

Salt Lake City, Utah

600

84111-1915

ADDENDUM 2

LETTER OF ROBERT S. CAMPBELL DATED NOVEMBER 18, 1989

LAW O F F I C E S
kVID K. WATKISS
DBERT S.CAMPBELL, JR.
*MES P. COWLEY
IRSCHEL J . SAPERSTEIN
WAYNE WADSWORTH
LLIAM VOGEL
HILIP C. PUGSLEY
_EN E. DAVIES
>BERTO. MAACK
REGORY B. MONSON
.LAN T. BR1NKERHOFF
E1STON L. HARRIS
BARNEY GESAS
^NGDONT. OWEN, JR.
WID B. WATKISS
^REN C. JENSON
.IZABETH T. DUNNING
:RNON L. HOPKINSON
RANDALL TRUEBLOOD
NCENTC. RAMPTON
DSEPH T. DUNBECK, JR.
?ACY H. FOWLER
L. K N U T H
:NNIS J . CONROY

STEVEN T. WATERMAN
KEN P. J O N E S
DEBRA J . M O O R E
C A S S C. B U T L E R
STUART W. H I N C K L E Y
STEVEN G . F O R S Y T H
PERRIN R. L O V E
H. D I C K S O N B U R T O N
DANIEL J . TORKELSON
G E O R G E T. W A D D O U P S
C H A R L O T T E L. M I L L E R
M A R T I N R. D E N N E Y
S T E V E N E. M c C O W I N
CAROLYN COX
W I L L I A M H. C H R I S T E N S E N
C. S C O T T B R O W N
LESLIE J . RANDOLPH
L A W R E N C E R. D I N G I V A N
M A T T H E W C. B A R N E C K
S T E V E N W. C A L L
P A U L A. H O F F M A N
J O N C. M A R T I N S O N
R O B E R T W. C O T T L E

WATKISS S CAMPBELL
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

or

COUNSEL

Z A R E. HAYES
TWELFTH

FLOOR

3IO SOUTH MAIN

STREET

S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H 8 4 I O I - 2 I 7 I

TELEPHONE
(SOI) 3 6 3 - 3 3 0 0

November 18, 1989

TELECOPIER
(80I) 3 5 0 - 3 8 9 2

WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER:

NOV 22 1

J. Richard Catten, Esq.
Assistant City Attorney
2470 South Redwood Road
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Re:

West Valley City v. Majestic Investment, et al.
Court Appeal No. 89-0379-CA

Dear Mr. Catten:
Under date of November 3, 1989, 1 received without prior
notice your letter together with a West Valley City warrant in
the sum of $181,961.32 and a form for Partial Satisfaction of
Judgment which you requested that 1 sign.
I have consulted with my client upon his return to Utah
and I am authorized to advise you that your proposed tender of
monies and Partial Satisfaction of Judgment is invalid and
rejected.
The bases for our determination is simple. The tender
has been made on the premise that the judgment of the district
court was severable or somehow bifurcated
in specific,
departmentalized components, viz., MajesticTs share in the
Prudential and Lockhart buildings and improvements vis-a-vis the
land. The amended judgment of Just Compensation makes no such
distinctions.
It is not a severable judgment but rather one
which merges all facets of the trial into a single non-severable
judgment upon which interest at 8% ran to the date of judgment
with 12% post-judgment interest presently running.
The case law is clear that a tender of part payment of
judgment which attempts to sever the judgment into segregated
parts, is invalid and improper. Accordingly, I return to you
your proposed form of Partial Satisfaction of Judgment which I
decline to sign, as well as your warrant dated November 3, 1989
in the sum of $181,961.32.

WATKISS &

CAMPBELL

J. Richard Catten, Esq.
November 18, 1989
Page 2
As I indicated to you by telephone, if you wish to make
a non-conditional tender of payment and partial satisfaction of
the Amended Judgment of Just Compensation, we will have no
objection to that and will accept the same and acknowledge such
further partial satisfaction.
Sincerely,

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
Attorneys for Majestic
Investment
RSC/dd
cc: Majestic Investment
Harold A. Hintze, Esq.

ADDENDUM 3

PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

Harold A. Hintze, P.C. A-1400
OLSEN, HINTZE, NIELSON & HILL
3319 No. University Ave., Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
Attorney for Plaintiff
Paul T. Morris, #3738
West Valley City Attorney
J. Richard Catten, #4291
Assistant City Attorney
247 0 South Redwood Road
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Telephone: (801) 974-5501
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY, a Municipal
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

MAJESTIC INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; and DOES
1 THROUGH 10,

:
:
:
:
:

Defendants.

:

PARTIAL SATISFACTION
OF JUDGMENT
Civil No- C87-6899
Judge Leonard H. Russon

I, Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Attorney for Majestic Investment
Company, in this action, acknowledge a parcel satisfaction of a
judgment rendered against Plaintiff in the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Utah, in an eminent domain action.
Judgment was entered by the Court on February 15, 1989, on the
following parcel of property:
PARCEL 1.
Beginning at a point on the West side of 2700
West Street, said point being South 865.72
feet and West 50.00 feet from the N.E. corner
of the N.W. 1/4 of Section 33, T. 1 S., R. 1
W. , Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence: S 00°00'44" W. 90.67 feet along the

West line of 2700 West Street; thence S.
89°56'20" W. 156.22 feet to a point 30.00 feet
East of an existing building; thence running
parallel to and 30.00 feet away from the said
building for the next three courses and
distances: N. 00°00'44" E. 2.33 feet; thence
N. 00°00'44" E. 88.34 feet; thence N. 89°56'20"
E. 129.22 feet to the point of beginning.
Contains: 0.270 acres
Parcel 2.
Beginning at a point on the West side of 2700
West Street, said point being South 956.39
feet and West 50.00 feet from the N.E. corner
of the N.W. 1/4 of Section 33, T. 1 S., R. 1
W., Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running
thence: S. 00o00'44" W. 90.67 feet along the
West line of 2700 West Street; thence S.
89°56'20" W. 156.22 feet to a point 30.00 feet
East of an existing building; thence running
parallel to and 30.00 feet away from the said
building N. 00°00'44" E. 90.67 feet; thence N.
89°56'20" E. 156.22 feet to the point of
beginning.
Contains: 0.325 acres
TOGETHER with an easement for sewer, water and
other utility purposes, and a right of way for
ingress
and
egress
over
the
following
described property: Beginning at a point on
the West side of 2700 West Street, said point
being South 1047.06 feet and West 50.00 feet
from the Northeast corner of the Northwest
quarter of Section 33, Township 1 South, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence South 00°00'44" West 18.0 feet
along the West line of 2700 West Street;
thence South 89o56'20H West 4 82.16 feet; thence
North 00°00,44H East 18.0 feet; thence North89°56'20" East 482.16 feet to the point of
beginning.
ALSO TOGETHER with an easement for sewer,
water and other utility purposes, and a right
of way for ingress and egress over the
following described property: Beginning at a
point South 865.72 feet and West 179.22 feet
from the Northeast corner of the Northwest
quarter of Section 33, Township 1 South, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence South 89°56'20" West 30.0 feet
to an existing brick building; thence along
said building for the next three courses and

distances: South 00°00'44" West 58.34 feet;
thence South 89°56f20" West 27.0 feet; thence
South 00°00 f 44" West 123.0 feet; thence North
89°56 f 20"
East 30.0 feet; thence
North
00°00f 44"
East 93.0 feet; thence
North
89°56 ? 20"
East 27.0 feet; thence
North
00° 00'44" East 88.34 feet to the point of
beginning.
BEGINNING at a point on the West side of 2700
West Street, said point being South 865.72
feet and West 33.0 feet from the Northeast
corner of the Northwest quarter of Section 33
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, and running thence South 0°0 , 44"
West 181.34 feet along the West line of 2700
West Street; thence South 89°56'20" West 17
feet; thence North 0°0 , 44" East 181.34 feet;
thence North 89° 56'20" East 17 feet to the
point of beginning.
This Partial Satisfaction of Judgment acknowledges that judgment
was entered in favor of Majestic Investment Company on the 15th day
of February, 1989 for the sum of $364,888.36, less the sum of
$69,198.00 tendered incident to the order of immediate occupancy,
or a net deficiency judgment of $295,690.36, together with interest
at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of occupancy to the date
of judgment in the sum of $31,108.80. Accordingly, there was a net
deficiency judgment, inclusive of interest through February 15,
1989 in the sum of $326,799.16, together with taxable costs, as the
Just Compensation payable to Majestic Investment Company.
This Partial Satisfaction of Judgment further acknowledges
that as of the 3rd day of November, 1989 there was due and owing
as the Just Compensation, inclusive of post-judgment interest at
12% per annum, the sum of $356,130.28.

As of said date, West

Valley City paid to Majestic Investment Company and its counsel the
sum of $181,961.32 by City warrant No. 40368, leaving a net and

outstanding judgment due and owing to Majestic Investment Company
of $174,168.96, which judgment will continue to bear interest at
the rate of 12% per annum on the net principal judgment, which
calculates to $47.62 per day from November 3, 1989, until full
satisfaction is paid by West Valley City in the matter.
It is further acknowledged that this Partial Satisfaction of
Judgment shall have no effect on the rights, standing or obligations of the parties with respect to the appeal filed in this case
with the Utah Court of Appeals, as Case No. 890379-CA.
DATED this 11th day of December, 1989.

f ^ , f ^

ROBERT S. CAM«B*S&^ JR.
Attorney for Majestic Investment
Company
STATE OF UTAH
SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this 11th day of December, 1989, personally appeared before
me Robert S. Campbell, Jr., signer of the foregoing instrument, who
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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My Commission Expires:
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